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This paper suggests that an over-investment on real estate may be one major source of the 
fundamental weakness of some financially troubled Asian economies. An over-development of 
the real estate sector could dissipate the crucial process of building a strong productive capacity of 
the economy. We analyze investments and savings in Korea and compare with those of Japan, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. A few noticeable facts stand out between Korea and Taiwan. Korean 
growth performance was very close to Taiwan who was saving and investing 50% less in terms of 
the percentage shares of GDP. One possible explanation can be obtained in the decomposition of 
the total investment. Korea invested 36% of her total investment into the machinery and 
equipments category and Taiwan spent 48.8% of her total investment. We also attempted to show 
the measurement error as a possible source of grossly overvalued total saving rate in Korea. Once 
the measurement error is properly corrected, then households’ consumption occupies 68.9% of 
GDP and the total saving and investment ratio become 24% of GDP, which is very close to that of 
Taiwan. If the true saving rate of Korea is around the mid-20%, not the mid-30%, and if the past 
investment have heavily concentrated on housing and its related activities, then the Krugman-Lau 
debate tells us how we might prolong the past growth performance. Korea could improve the 
saving rate, say to the level of Japan. This input-driven growth can also be made more effective 





One would naturally expect that the issue of “over-consumption” given such a 
prominent role in the debate of economic restructuring following the Asian crisis must bear a 
certain amount of explanatory power for the current state of the economy.
1  We also hear 
about the factual evidence of excessive (?) amount of saving in Asian economies, which 
seem to be at odds with the phenomenon of over-consumption. This paper attempts to 
suggest that the form of wealth accumulation that puts an unusually heavy emphasis on real 
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estate may explain the evident contradiction. We show that this might also be one major 
source of the fundamental weakness of some Asian economies that have succumbed to the 
pressure from the recent financial crisis. 
From consumers’ point of view, the investment in residential construction is an 
important form of saving, which in turn is captured as investment in national income 
statistics. This saving-investment connection is clear and self-explanatory. Residential 
construction is a major part of national wealth accumulation and the service derived from the 
stock is an ultimate measure of economic welfare. An over-development of the  sector, 
however, could dissipate the crucial process of building a strong productive capacity of the 
economy’s external sector, which often has been the source of foreign exchange earnings for 
newly industrializing countries. The bubbly real-estate investment boom, regardless of its 
sources, may engender a few unusual resource allocation problems for the economy and its 
consumers. 
First, a heavier than normal proportion of national saving that is devoted to housing 
and its associated investment simply implies that industrial capacity building and other 
productivity-enhancing resources receive a smaller share. For an economy relying on 
steadily improving foreign exchange earnings and on strengthening domestic capital 
formation, this could be a potential bottleneck in the process of sustained growth process. 
Second, the asset-accumulation in the form of houses and apartments during the real-estate 
boom is indeed very attractive. In particular, when the future economy is pictured bright and 
promising, this is regarded as an almost risk-free option in the spectrum of portfolio choices. 
Concerted efforts to save more are made and even a heavy borrowing is encouraged to 
expedite the asset acquisition. Holding appreciating assets may result in excessive transitory 
consumption over a period of time. For this reason, one may feel justified for calling 
“over-consumption” as a possible culprit for the current economic troubles. A more 
interesting aspect is that the asset-holding individuals are experiencing an abnormally heavy 
expenditure on housing. Coupled with the idiosyncratic measurement problems, we have the 
inconsistency of high saving rate and over-consumption. 
Finally, the penchant for the peculiar form of asset accumulation could induce the 
financial sector to misalign the portfolio balance over a significant period of time. When the 
tide changes, of course, this would create havoc for the whole economy as we have been 
witnessing recently. The field of finance and development seems to have paid little attention 
to the composition of wealth accumulation and its consequences on the growth path of a 
developing economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section looks at a simple asset-market 
equilibrium model with real estate as one of the key sectors. The standard comparative- static 
exercises will be performed in order to derive a few implications of asset market bubbles. 
One of the results is that the real interest rate could remain high, which in turn could depress 
the investment activities of the real sector while encouraging the investment in the housing 
sector. Section III considers the housing investment and imputed rent in Korea and compares 
with those of Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand. Section IV discusses the implications of the 
finding for the debate on the nature of East-Asian development patterns (a-la Kim-Lau 
controversy, Kim and Lau (1994)) and for the efficiency of capital stock. The paper ends 
with some concluding remarks. JUNG, AHN AND HONG: WHERE DO WE INVEST? A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
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II. Asset Market Equilibrium 
 
In the standard macroeconomic literature, wealth is defined as: 
 
, K B M W + + =                                                 (1) 
 
where  , , , B M W   and  K are wealth, liquid (monetary) asset, (government-issued) bond, and 
capital, respectively. Capital is held in the form of equity ownership. Most studies leave land 
L out of this for it plays a minor role in the short-run theoretical discussion in the standard 
macroeconomics dealing with developed economies.  For example, the analysis of  an 
open-market operation looks into the effects on the economy of simultaneous changes in 
money and bond. Even for the long-run analysis, it receives only a tangential treatment in the 
mainstream literature. Although it is an important factor of (agricultural) production, land is 
not considered as a form of national wealth accumulation. This does not imply, however, all 
lands are the same. Real estate with better infrastructure (irrigation, transportation facilities, 
and so on) is definitely more productive and valuable. Note that this sort of  real estate 
development expenditure is  a  part of  K  or captured by government expenditure (the 
investment part of the expenditure). 
Suppose private savers consider real estate investment as an attractive form of saving. 
It is easy to see how this might develop. Given the record of steady economic growth and the 
promising future prospect, rational agents wanting to maximize the return of their saving 
might consider ever-scarce real estate as a safest form of personal investment. Given a fragile 
capital market and the lack of transparency in financial transactions of corporate sector, real 
estate becomes the choicest mode of asset holding. People in countries like Japan, Hong 
Kong, and Korea with limited land tend to believe in the special value of land and have had a 
long history supporting their belief that land investment is always prudent. When a group of 
agents, albeit small, initiates competitive bidding for the given stock of land, the price starts 
creeping up and the pattern of speculative real estate boom develops if there exists a 
sufficient momentum in the rush.   
The sellers of real estate during the boom period collect capital gain which of course is 
financed by buyers’ saving. The portion of this gain geared for consumption leaks out of the 
saving-investment nexus. Thus this may be legitimately called over-consumption associated 
with the bubble phenomenon. Even if the gain is reinvested into real estate development, the 
residential construction that has become a major part of the investment activity imparts the 
significant consequences to the national capital stock and the economy’s capital output ratio. 
Moreover, the growth process might be significantly affected by the continual progress of 
real estate over-investment zeal. 
It is moot whether over-consumption is indeed responsible for the current economic 
problem. However, if the above calculation is upheld in the more systematic statistical 
investigation, it is true that consumption including true housing services was indeed 
extraordinarily high. At the same time, it means saving was not transformed into JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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production-related investment expenditures.
2 The high saving - high investment nexus is 
clearly broken and the mystery that why such a high saving rate did not turn the economy 
into a powerhouse of production and technology development is a simple statistical 
oversight.   
This section attempts to explore these possibilities by putting real estate into the wealth 
definition instead of bond. Consider the following asset market composition: 
 
, eF L M W + + =                                                   (2) 
 
where  , ,F L and  e  are real estate, foreign asset, and exchange rate (price of foreign money 
in terms of domestic currency units)  respectively.  We omitted capital stock in order to 
emphasize real estate and also for the sake of short-run analysis. The following describes the 
behavior of each market:
3 
 
) , ( W i m M = ,                                                        (3) 
 
) , , ( p W i l L = ,                                                      (4) 
 
) , ( W i f eF = ,                                                       (5) 
 
where  p is the expected inflation as a proxy for capital gain. The left-hand side of the 
equation is the supply and the right-hand side denotes the demand behavior. The four 
equations above describe the three asset markets and when any two markets are in 
equilibrium the third market can be residually determined. 
The theory of liquidity preference implies  0 < i m  and  0 > W m , where the subscripted 
behavioral equation denotes the partial derivative of the function with respect to its argument. 
The equilibrium in the real estate market depends on the rate of interest, wealth, and 
expected inflation. When the interest rate increases, the price of real estate decreases and its 
demand increases.
4 The higher the expected capital gain, the more attractive the holding of 
real estate. Thus, we have  0 , 0 > > p l li  and  0 > W l . Foreign assets become increasingly 
important for newly industrializing economies and capital movements have played a critical 
role during the asset-bubble period in recent years. The behavioral relation of its demand 
with the rate of domestic interest and the wealth is as expected:  0 < i f  and  0 > W f . 
 
 
2. Arguably, housing is, up to a point, a very important productivity-inducing input. The trend in Seoul seems to 
suggest that an average size and value of apartment and single family house are beyond the comparable norm. 
For example, the size is getting larger while the average family size shrinks and the construction becomes more 
upgraded. 
3. The model is standard as in Dernburg (1989), McCafferty (1990), and van Wijnbergen (1983) among many others. 
We adopt Dernburg’s description which seems expositionally simpler. 
4. Just consider real estate as a close substitute for bond whose price has an inverse relation with the rate of interest. JUNG, AHN AND HONG: WHERE DO WE INVEST? A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
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Combining the four equations into one, we have   
 
) , ( ) , , ( ) , ( W i f W i l W i m W + + = p , 
 
which, upon being differentiated with respect to  W  and  , i  yields  
 
W W W f l m + + = 1 ,                                                     (6) 
 
i i i f l m + + = 0 .                                                       (7) 
 
Equation (6) is the usual adding-up constraint; that is, an increase in wealth will end up in 
some combinations of increases in its components. The substitution among the three assets 
implies that  . 0 ) ( > + - = i i i f m l  An increase in the rate of  domestic interest causes 
substitution toward real estate away from domestic liquid asset and foreign asset.   
Equations (2) through (5) describe three asset markets and the Warlas law allows us to 
omit any one market in the equilibrium analysis. Given our focus, the preferred choice is the 
money market. Thus, the model consists of Equations (4), (5) and  
 
) , ( ) , , ( W i f W i l W M - - = p                                             (8) 
 
in three endogenous variables, i.e., and  . W  The model above does not include the exchange 
rate as an explicit argument in the demand equations, meaning the absence of currency 
substitution and the under-developed capital market. However, the exchange rate enters into 
each asset market indirectly by the relation 
 
Fde dW =                                                           (9) 
   
that is obtained by differentiating Equation (2). To see this, totally differentiate Equation (4) 
and use Equation (9) to obtain 
 
, 0 Fde l di l dW l di l W i W i + = + =                                         (10) 
 







 The equilibrium in the real estate market slopes negatively 
when pictured in the plane of the exchange rate and the rate of interest. A drop in the 
exchange rate (an appreciation of domestic currency) induces a decrease in the stock of 
wealth, which in turn implies a decrease in demand for all assets including real estate. Given 
the fixed amount of real-estate supply, this decrease has to be met by an increase in demand 
caused by an increase in the rate of domestic interest.   
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 which determine the slopes of money and foreign asset market in 
the plane of prices. An increase in the stock total wealth caused by an increase in the 
exchange rate brings about a higher demand for money, which has to be absorbed by an 
equal decrease in demand induced by an increase in the rate of interest. Thus, the money 
market equilibrium slopes upward. A similar argument de 
monstrates the slope of an equilibrium relation in the market for foreign assets is 
negative. The stability is guaranteed if the slope of the real-estate market equilibrium is 
steeper than that of the foreign asset market (see McCafferty (1990) for such an analysis). A 
simple algebraic manipulation shows that indeed this is the case given the assumption of the 
signs associated with partial derivatives.
5 
 
5. . 0 ) ( < + + ￿ < w w i w i
F L
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Figure 1 below shows that the market is in equilibrium at point a. Now, consider a 
capital inflow associated with trade deficit. Without an intervention, this will only create a 
depreciation of domestic currency without affecting the rate of interest. However, if the 
policy authority worries about the depreciation and/or inflation, a  tight monetary policy 
might be used to dampen the currency movement. Also suppose the capital inflow is 
funneled into residential construction fueled by an expectation of higher capital gain (p). 
The situation is depicted by a new equilibrium at point b. Exchange rate is stabilized but with 
a much higher domestic interest rate. The higher interest rate curbs the non-housing 
investment activities such as plant and equipment. The scenario might fit what happened in 
Korea and Thailand. Arguably, the exchange rates have been kept unreasonably low in Korea, 
perhaps aided by political factors.
6 The inflation-phobia combined with a temporarily 
sustained economic boom could also have helped the high-interest-rate policy. At least in 
Korea, the bulk of available fund has been siphoned into the hands of major business groups 
and the high rate of interest must have discouraged other potentially productive investment 
projects by small and medium enterprises. 
On the other hand, a trade surplus creates an opposite result. In the absence of policy 
intervention, the surplus generates an increase in  F  which will put an upward pressure in 
the exchange rate market, with a net result of a constant value of  eF . Worrying about the 
international competitiveness, the likely policy response might be an easy money. The 
interest rate will stay low and make non-housing investments more attractive. The situations 
of Japan and ROC may be the case in point. Although Japanese yen has been strengthened in 
the 90s, the N.T. dollar paralleled the movement of Korean won.
7 The interest rates in Japan 
and ROC were relatively much lower than those of Thailand and Korea (see Table 1). The 
next section will investigate the consequences of these contrasting policy reactions.   
 
Table 1  Nomianl (Real) Interest Rates (percentage (%)) 
Year  Japan  ROC  Thailand  Korea 
1991  7.46(4.79)  6.78(2.93)  11.15(5.40)  17.00(6.90) 
1992  4.58(2.85)  6.50(2.57)  6.93(2.44)  14.30(8.24) 
1993  3.06(2.45)  6.35(2.84)  6.54(3.21)  12.10(7.01) 
1994  2.20(2.03)  6.10(4.21)  7.25(2.12)  12.50(7.02) 
1995  1.21(1.85)  5.75(3.81)  10.96(4.96)  12.60(7.00) 
1996  0.47(0.93)  5.20(2.52)  9.23(5.20)  12.40(8.99) 
1997  0.48(ꎭ0.10)  5.35(3.50)  15.69(10.26)  13.20(10.81) 
Average  2.78(2.11)  6.00(3.20)  9.68(4.80)  13.44(8.00) 
Note: All nominal rates are money market rates except for ROC’s time deposit rates. Real rate is simply nominal 
minus inflation and the latter is calculated using GNP deflators. 
 
 
6. Often, policy makers identify currency depreciation with a symptomatic failure of economic policies and attempt 
to maintain the value until the last minute. 
7. The Japanese capital market is much more open and subject to the international market influences. The current 
swings in the value of the yen well reflect the underlying volatility of the currency. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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III. Investment Activities and the Measurement of Saving 
 
Consider the basic national income identity: 
 
), ( ) ( EX IM G T S I - + - + =                                           (11) 
 
where the notations are standard. Often we just look at how national saving is divided into 
private and public and how much foreign saving contributes toward the total investment. A 
given amount (in terms of shares of GDP) of total investment may consist of many different 
combinations of investment categories. As shown in Figure 1, a policy response that brings 
about a higher interest rate will favor residential construction whereas sacrificing investment 
in plant and equipment. The private saving might be high but a sizable portion of this might 
be devoted to accumulating wealth in the form of housing rather than non-residential capital 
stock through financial intermediation. Efficient capital markets separate savers and investors, 
whereas an underdeveloped financial system tends to limit the diversification of portfolio. 
Table 2 and 3 show the above national income identity for ROC and Korea. A few 
noticeable facts stand out. First, the ROC’s economy saves 3.1% in foreign economies on 
average, whereas the Korean economy accumulates 1.5% per year on average as a sovereign 
debt. The net difference between the two countries is 4.6%. Second, in terms of the percent- 
ages of national income Korea invests 13.8% more per year than ROC. Given that both 
economies have often been exemplified as cases of successful economic development, this is 
indeed a remarkable difference. To accomplish such a high investment rate, Koreans had to 
rely on a high saving both by the private sector and by the government sector. The Korean 
private sector saves 6.5% more than that of ROC, whereas the Korean government saves 
2.8% more than the counterpart in ROC. One would imagine such a high rate of investment 
in Korea must have produced an equally high growth rate of the economy. The statistical data 
on growth performance, however, are puzzling. While Korea saves and invests almost 50% 
more than its neighboring country in terms of the percentage of national income, the 
difference in growth rates in the 1990s is less than 1%, Korea being slightly higher than ROC. 
Two possible explanations for the lack of connection between investment and growth are 
postulated: a measurement of consumption and the nature of investment activities themselves. 
 
Table 2  Investment and Saving: ROC (% of GNP) 
Year  I   S   G T -   EX IM -  
1990  22.5  20.1  7.2  ꎭ4.8 
1991  22.7  22.5  4.6  ꎭ4.4 
1992  24.4  19.7  6.8  ꎭ2.1 
1993  24.8  19.0  8.6  ꎭ2.8 
1994  23.6  17.9  7.6  ꎭ1.9 
1995  23.4  19.0  6.4  ꎭ2.0 
1996  21.1  19.7  5.3  ꎭ3.9 
1997  22.1  19.1  5.6  ꎭ2.6 
Average  23.1  19.6  6.5  ꎭ3.1 
Data: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Council of Economic Planning and Development, 1998. JUNG, AHN AND HONG: WHERE DO WE INVEST? A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
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Table 3  Investment and Saving: Korea (% of GNDI) 
Year  I   S   G T -   EX IM -  
1990  36.8  27.2  8.7  .9 
1991  39.1  28.3  7.8  3.0 
1992  36.4  27.1  7.8  1.5 
1993  35.2  26.7  8.6  ꎭ.1 
1994  36.5  26.0  9.3  1.2 
1995  37.3  25.7  10.6  1.0 
1996  38.9  23.6  11.3  4.0 
1997  35.3  24.3  10.3  0.7 
Average  36.9  26.1  9.3  1.5 
 











1990  11.8  16.1  20.0  51.3 
1991  10.8  16.8  22.2  49.2 
1992  12.1  16.0  22.5  48.6 
1993  13.8  13.7  25.0  46.1 
1994  12.1  13.8  26.6  46.7 
1995  10.1  14.2  25.8  49.3 
1996  8.4  14.6  25.9  50.2 
Average  11.3  15.0  24.0  48.8 
 











1989  19.4  17.8  19.8  39.2 
1990  19.0  18.3  19.9  39.1 
1991  17.1  20.5  20.3  38.4 
1992  16.5  21.9  20.9  36.9 
1993  17.7  22.2  21.6  34.6 
1994  19.6  21.4  21.9  33.0 
Average  18.2  20.4  20.7  36.9 
 











1990  22.8  13.1  12.1  49.9 
1991  23.7  13.3  13.0  48.5 
1992  19.7  14.9  15.8  48.4 
1993  18.8  15.7  15.0  49.2 
1994  18.7  13.7  17.4  48.9 
1995  17.5  13.0  16.4  52.0 
1996  16.3  12.2  18.8  51.7 
Average  19.6  13.7  15.5  49.8 
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
  104 











1990  22.0  18.5  15.6  40.5 
1991  21.6  16.2  17.5  36.8 
1992  20.6  15.1  20.5  35.8 
1993  24.2  18.2  22.1  34.2 
1994  21.2  16.9  21.0  35.9 
1995  21.2  17.5  20.1  35.3 
1996  19.6  16.0  21.8  33.7 
Average  21.5  16.9  19.8  36.0 
 
First, consider how the total investment is disaggregated into sub-categories. Table 4 
shows the composition of ROC’s gross capital formation. Machinery and equipment includes 
transportation equipment. Comparing with Table 7 for Korea, we notice that Korea has spent 
21.5% of her total investment in residential construction during the period of 1990-1996.
8 
During the same period, ROC spent 11.3% of her total investment on housing sector. In 
terms of percentage shares of GNP (or GDP), Korea invested 6.7% of her GNP into housing 
sector, whereas ROC did only 2.6%. The difference is astounding.
9 One might tempt to say 
the difference is simply equivalent to that of percentage difference of foreign savings of the 
two economies. They also differ in investment in machinery and equipment. Korea invested 
36% of her total investment (13.3% of GDP) into this category and ROC spent 48.8% of her 
total investment (11.3% of GDP). 
Table 5 and 6 show the composition of total fixed capital formation of Japan and 
Thailand, respectively. Japan is seen to have invested in machinery and equipment in terms 
of percentage of output as much as Korea, whereas Thailand’s emphasis on this category is 
as strong as ROC’s. Thailand’s investment in residential construction has been vigorous up 
to the recent crisis, but the non-residential and other construction, on the other hand, took the 
smallest share of the total investment among the four economies. The much talked-about real 
estate construction boom in Thailand seemed to be a phenomenon that only recently 
developed.   
Both Thailand and Korea have relied on foreign capital inflow in order to maintain 
their high investment activities. At the same time these economies also attempted to stabilize 
foreign exchange rates. The analysis in the previous section indicates what would be 
expected of portfolio adjustment in this situation. A strong development in the residential 
 
8. Construction value is imputed rather than collected. The process starts from the permits (housing and construction 
starts) and the actual buildings are deemed to be constructed one month after the official permit. The average 
square footage is assessed and the average cost of construction is applied. After the basic job is done at a base 
year, updates are made using an appropriate deflator. Given the importance of the sector, the simplistic imputation 
process seems clearly inadequate and there appear more appropriate methods of calculating the value of 
investment and hence an improved measure of imputed rent (see below for the problem of the rent imputation). 
9.  One also observes that a significant portion of non-residential construction in Korea is geared toward 
semi-residential activities and other entertainment service activities. JUNG, AHN AND HONG: WHERE DO WE INVEST? A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
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construction would prevail with a high rate of interest. In Thailand, the investment in 
machinery and equipment still remained high perhaps due to a smaller role of public works.   
Next, consider the possibility that saving might have been measured with a systematic 
bias. Alternative measures of national income statistics must eventually be aligned with each 
other for their consistency. For example, rewards to factors of production add up to national 
income. One of the items is rent that is normally imputed for services derived from the stock 
of housing and other real estate items such as office buildings. When consumers own their 
houses based on long-term  mortgage contracts or rent from the commercial firms as in US, 
the market assessment of the housing services is straightforward. In Korea, people use the 
mortgage financing less often and, when they do, a very small portion of the total value of 
their houses. Currently the imputed rent occupies only 5% of the national income and the 
household expenditure statistics shows about 12% of the total expenditure being allocated to 
housing, heat and water. Since consumption is about half of the national income the two 
statistical figures are consistent. We find these statistics simply unrealistic. To get a different 
feel, we would like to experiment with a couple of simple-minded exercises. 
In principle, the imputed rent is calculated based on accumulated housing stock and 
sample rental value of the housing. Housing stock, as with other form of capital stock, eludes 
accurate measurement. At least, it is feasible to count the number of apartment units and 
single family dwellings. Imputed rent in the current Korean NIA (National Income Account) 
statistics (appeared as a part of finance, insurance, r eal estate and other service in the 
production table) is more problematic. The informal survey simply shows an average 
household in Seoul spends on housing approximately half of the imputed income (imputed 
because of the assessed value of housing expenditure in terms of the foregone interest 
income by owning the house). For example, the ratio between monthly income and the value 
of house/apartment for an average household in Seoul is very close to 0.01. Assuming a 1% 
monthly interest for simplicity, then the households are spending 50% of the total imputed 
income on housing services. If this calculation is true, then households’ consumption 
occupies 68.9% of GDP and the total saving and investment ratio become 24% of GDP 
which is very close to that of ROC.
10  The private saving’s ratio also is lowered to 17% 
which is comparable to ROC’s 19.6%. Perhaps this is closer to the reality and the commonly 
recognized behavioral pattern. Ironically, this correction will increase GNP by almost 50% 
but at the same time lowers the growth rate at least a couple of percentage points. Albeit 
debatable, this seems a sensible adjustment and at least it may resolve the puzzles posited at 
the introduction. We could take this as a lower bound of a new saving rate. 
The ratio of imputed rent to GDP is shown to be around 3.8% in Korea during the 
period of 1990-1997. The comparable figures in Japan and ROC are 8.3% and 7.8%, 
 
10. One may object to this sort of back-of-the-envelope calculation but this is quite convincing. For example, the 
average value of single-family house in US is around $100,000 which will cost the owner approximately $7,000 
a year in terms of  foregone interest income. An average rent of an apartment is $600 to $700 which is in line 
with an alternative of owning a house. If the median family income is $50,000, the expenditure share of housing 
is approximately 14%. Approximately 14-15% of personal consumption expenditures is currently allocated to 
housing services. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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respectively. We believe the Korean data is simply too low and suggest an alternative value 
of at least 12%. According to the household panel survey conducted by Daewoo Research 
Institute, the only annual survey of its kind since 1993, the ratio of rent to income of the 
urban non-owner households is .15 during 1993-1996. The Annual Farm Household 
Economic Survey conducted by Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries suggests that 
the ratio in the rural area is slightly higher than that for the urban counterparts. Hence, we 
can safely conjecture that the ratio of rent to income of the nation’s non-owner households is 
at least .15. Let’s say the ratio of imputed rent to income of the owner-occupied households 
is also .15. Then, since National Income is about 78% of GDP in Korea, the ratio of imputed 
rent to GDP is approximately 12%. This estimate will increase the level of GDP by 9%, raise 
the consumption ratio by 3 percentage points, and lowers the national saving rate by 3 
percentage points to 32%. We may take this as the upper bound of the true saving rate. 
If the statistical method of measuring the imputed rent,  however consistently 
maintained over time, is downwardly biased, then the consumption is underestimated and 
hence saving is overestimated. The above exercise suggests that the true total saving rate 
may be anywhere between 24% and 34%, not 37%. Growth performance and casual 
observation indicate that it would be closer to 24%. The National Tax Administration (NTA) 
data on housing properties are used in calculating the imputed housing value (after being 
multiplied by the standard rents).
11 Note that the imputed rent is captured as an earning on 
the income side and the same amount is listed as consumption of housing service on the 
expenditure side. To make the matters worse, the asset bubbles on the make could dwarf 
imputed rent due to the fixed base-year standard rental value and hence further underestimate 
the true economic consumption.   
 
IV. The Kim-Lau Controversy 
 
The previous discussion attempted to show a possible justification for the inception 
and progress of real estate investment boom. The emphatic development of housing sector 
accompanies a frenzied real estate development and possibly the phenomenon of an asset 
bubble, which indeed was the case in a few Asian countries. The bubble instigates a social 
unrest and requires a long recovery period when burst. A lapse in the middle of growth 
process is a dead-weight loss. 
Krugman (1994) reignited the debate on the sources of the East Asian growth. Kim 
and Lau (1994) and Young (1995) suggested that the growth of the East Asian development 
is mainly input-driven, implying that the absence of technological progress in the record 
could bring an end to the impressive growth record. Policy economists in the government 
circle, in particular, seemed overly provoked by the bold statement and some academic 
economists have scrutinized the empirical studies suspecting the validity of the finding. 
Although Krugman seemed more interested in defending the traditional capitalism and 
 
11. The base year used in this sort of benchmarking lags always several years. When the asset bubbles are in the 
progress, the imputed rent using an earlier sample figure from the market could significantly underestimate the 
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playing down the role of government policies, the main source of his arguments lies in the 
fact that input growths exhausted most of the output increments. We wish to limit the 
relevance of our study to the input-driven growth process of the debate, leaving other aspects 
of the argument for future studies. 
The neoclassical growth theory is the easiest way to understand the debate. Ignoring 
the exogenously determined technological progress, the theory predicts conditional 
convergence. The lower the initial level of the economy, the higher is the growth rate. If the 
East Asian growth is based on input growth, then without the technological improvement or 
the continued increase in the saving rate the growth process will soon end. If the true saving 
rate of Korea is around the mid-20%, not the mid-30%, and if the past investment have 
heavily concentrated on housing and its related activities, then the debate tells us how we 
might prolong the past growth performance. Korea could improve the saving rate, say to the 
level of Japan. This input-driven growth can also be made more effective by improving the 
efficiency of investment. Less housing and more machinery and equipment investment 
would certainly help enhance the labor productivity, if not consumer welfare. 
There are other aspects of the debate. For example, trade and development economists 
will emphasize the role of openness in promoting growth and development. On this account, 
Korea certainly has to improve much more. Who in fact is involved in trade might have 
qualitative implications. Business group-dominated Korean development is under heated 
criticism and the role of ROC’s small and medium enterprises in industrial development 
should be carefully compared and analyzed. Endogenous growth theories provide more 
challenging avenues toward the continued growth for the East Asian economies. Was the 
development up to this point a mere catch-up in technological and human knowledge 
development? If so, then the real development is to take place from now on, replacing the 
input-driven growth based on technology imitation. The role of governmental policies should 
now take a much different tack. Promoting intellectual property rights and utilizing taxation 
in R&D enhancement are clearly different from industry targeting and differential treatment 
of industries through non-market policies.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The current research began from a simple question: if Asian countries showed 
drastically different reactions to the recent crisis, shouldn’t we be able to provide more 
logically distinguishing characteristics of different groups of economies? The search began 
with the telltale signs of asset bubbles and soon reached to decomposition of the total 
investment. 
Section II provided a theoretical underpinning for analyzing the housing construction 
boom in Thailand and Korea. This suggested that perhaps these countries curtailed 
investment opportunities that are more directly related to improving the economies’ capacity 
of manufacturing and non-housing services. Given the high investment and saving rate of 
Korea, her growth performance was very close to ROC who was saving 50% less in terms of 
the percentage shares of GDP. The simplistic experiments were attempted to show the 
measurement error as a possible source of grossly overvalued total saving rate. Section IV 
touched upon the implications of the findings for the recent growth debate ala JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Kim-Lau-Young-Krugman. 
More has to be done. The theory must include bond market for a richer analysis. 
Statistical facts must be scrutinized and expanded to include some other countries. The 
measurement problems of different countries must be compared. Theory and empirical 
findings must be cross-referenced for better understanding on the future prospects and the 
correct assessment of the so-called Asian miracle.   JUNG, AHN AND HONG: WHERE DO WE INVEST? A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
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